Lately, looking at DAO proposals makes me a bit amused. On the surface, it's "optimizing parameters / improving efficiency," but underneath, it's really about who can press the button and who can get a piece of the fee pie. The more it looks like a paper, the more you have to watch the incentives: Is voting power dispersed or concentrated in a few proxies? Is there a time lock on execution rights, or can proposals pass at 2 a.m.? Honestly, many "governance" proposals are just updates and iterations of power structures. By the way, outside discussions are about rate cut expectations, the dollar index, and risk assets sometimes rising and falling together, sometimes moving inversely. The more these sentiments drift, the easier it is for "urgent proposals" in the DAO to be manipulated for momentum. As for what I mean by "long-term," don't talk about quarterly annualized figures. For me, it’s about surviving two voting cycles without incentives being completely exploited (roughly over a month). Anyway, first treat human nature as a constant, then look at the parameters.