Recently, a series of decision changes by a certain country regarding large infrastructure projects reflect the rational adjustments developing countries make in the face of reality.

A once-planned North-South high-speed rail project experienced significant setbacks within just two weeks. A leading enterprise group reached an agreement with European partners but announced its withdrawal from the project after only 8 days. The reasons behind this are quite thought-provoking.

The total investment for the project amounts to $67 billion, which is 86% of the local annual fiscal revenue. The enterprise group was only willing to cover 20% of this, expecting the government to bear the remaining $53.6 billion, and also demanded a 35-year zero-interest loan. The local financial authorities immediately rejected this proposal, clearly stating that such a risk structure does not conform to the basic principles of public-private partnerships and would threaten the country's credit rating.

Financial difficulties are only superficial; technical bottlenecks are the core issue. High-speed rail construction involves complex system integration including civil engineering, rolling stock, signaling, and operations. The European partners' technology was not as fully open as expected. Although they participated in technical planning, key components still needed to be imported.

Even more problematic is the geological adaptation issue. The 1,541-kilometer route must traverse various complex terrains—karst landscapes in the north, mountain tunnels in the middle, soft soil deltas in the south, and along the coast, challenges like salt-alkali corrosion and typhoons must be addressed. Europe's high-speed rail experience is mainly in temperate regions; once in tropical complex geological environments, the water and soil conditions are unsuitable, and the unit cost per kilometer is more than double that of similar projects.

Economic feasibility calculations are even more sobering. After completion, the operation would take 5 hours, and ticket prices would need to be set above 700 yuan to break even. However, for the same intercity distance, flights only take 2 hours and may even be cheaper. According to internal estimates by the enterprise, over a 30-year operational cycle, annual revenue would be $5.6 billion, but daily operating costs would be $4.2 billion. When adding principal interest and equipment depreciation, the operational difficulties are obvious.

This is not an isolated incident. As early as 2006, the local government had discussed a similar project with Japan. The feasibility study report provided by Japan was shockingly expensive—$55.8 billion. Over more than a decade of negotiations, the plan was repeatedly revised, with budgets only increasing, and ultimately the project was abandoned without progress. This time, seeking European cooperation, the initial intention was to diversify risks, but the project stumbled over two tough hurdles: funding and technology.

After the project stalled, the original multiple bidding companies either lacked practical engineering capabilities or continued to rely on high leverage and government loans. The number of capable entities willing to take over was very limited.

A breakthrough has appeared. The local side has begun to actively adjust its approach, clearly stating that it no longer insists on so-called technology transfer requirements, as long as the project can be completed on schedule with a professional team involved throughout. This shift reflects a sober understanding of technological capabilities and cost realities.

A key factor is the broader trend of regional connectivity. Several neighboring international railway corridors are already under construction or in planning, all adopting unified technical standards. If the new project chooses a compatible solution, it can seamlessly connect to a larger regional network in the future, directly linking major cities to neighboring countries and even farther destinations, significantly improving logistics efficiency. Conversely, if different standards are adopted, costs will soar due to changing train heads, manual inspections, and other procedures.

Vietnam’s decision adjustment essentially marks a re-evaluation of its 20-year high-speed rail dream against its own capabilities. Previously, it tried to balance risks through diversified partnerships, but this only put itself in a dilemma. Now, Vietnam finally understands that large infrastructure projects are not political performances; without the financial capacity and technical foundation, even the most beautiful blueprints are just illusions.

Currently, substantial progress has been made in cross-border railway cooperation. A standard-gauge railway project has already begun construction, with technical teams involved throughout the process. Letting go of unrealistic expectations and choosing pragmatic cooperation may be the only way for this project to break out of its predicament.

This case serves as a wake-up call for developing countries: large infrastructure projects can never be realized through wishful thinking. Finding truly reliable partners is more important than any political considerations.