#Trust Wallet黑客事件 Seeing the Trust Wallet incident, I still feel a heavy weight in my heart. From the covert operation starting on December 8th to the successful backdoor implantation on December 22nd, and then the transfer of funds beginning on Christmas—this entire process's precision reminds me of some of the classic supply chain attack cases in history. Over 6 million USD was lost in the official version, and ironically, users chose it precisely because they trusted it.
This makes me think of the 2016 Bitfinex incident, which was also carried out through multi-layer infiltration. The difference is that this time it was an attack on the exchange's hot wallet, whereas this time the client itself became the backdoor—meaning the key defensive line collapsed. SlowMist team pointed out that the developer's device or code repository might have been compromised, indicating a deeper security signal.
I've seen too many projects decline due to a single supply chain security lapse. Wallet applications are especially vulnerable because they directly hold user assets. The key is that once trust is broken, recovery takes many times longer and consumes more resources. Looking at the evolution of projects over the past decade, such incidents often become turning points for the decline of an ecosystem. The current issue is not just patching the vulnerability, but rebuilding user trust—which is often the most expensive cost.
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#Trust Wallet黑客事件 Seeing the Trust Wallet incident, I still feel a heavy weight in my heart. From the covert operation starting on December 8th to the successful backdoor implantation on December 22nd, and then the transfer of funds beginning on Christmas—this entire process's precision reminds me of some of the classic supply chain attack cases in history. Over 6 million USD was lost in the official version, and ironically, users chose it precisely because they trusted it.
This makes me think of the 2016 Bitfinex incident, which was also carried out through multi-layer infiltration. The difference is that this time it was an attack on the exchange's hot wallet, whereas this time the client itself became the backdoor—meaning the key defensive line collapsed. SlowMist team pointed out that the developer's device or code repository might have been compromised, indicating a deeper security signal.
I've seen too many projects decline due to a single supply chain security lapse. Wallet applications are especially vulnerable because they directly hold user assets. The key is that once trust is broken, recovery takes many times longer and consumes more resources. Looking at the evolution of projects over the past decade, such incidents often become turning points for the decline of an ecosystem. The current issue is not just patching the vulnerability, but rebuilding user trust—which is often the most expensive cost.