An interesting phenomenon worth pondering: when a platform introduces a posting subsidy mechanism, it often results in a flood of low-quality content and spam. This reflects an economic paradox.

So, what if we design it the other way around? Imagine a parallel content platform that adopts the opposite incentive model—each post does not receive a subsidy but instead incurs a cost, such as $1 per post. Could such a mechanism significantly reduce the generation of spam content?

From an economic perspective, this "posting cost" model would theoretically create a natural content filter. Users would be more cautious before posting, and only truly valuable insights would be worth spending money to share. This would undoubtedly alter the overall quality curve of the content ecosystem.

Of course, this hypothesis requires more detailed elaboration, but it reveals the deep impact of platform incentive mechanisms on the content ecosystem— the direction of incentives directly shapes participants' behavior patterns.