Third-Party Module Exploit Drains $3.2M From Gnosis Safes

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A third-party Gnosis Safe module exploited across Ethereum and Base drained approximately $3.2 million from 86 Safes in roughly two hours, according to security firms Blockaid and PeckShield. The vulnerable contract, verified on Basescan under the name "SquidRouterModule," was not built, deployed, or operated by the cross-chain protocol Squid. Squid co-founder Fig clarified on X: "The contract called SquidRouterModule is unrelated to Squid. We don't know yet who wrote or deployed this." The exploit succeeded because the module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary calldata and spend tokens held in victim Safes without signatures. This incident reflects ongoing security vulnerabilities in the DeFi sector, which has logged more than $770 million in losses in 2026, with April alone recording roughly 30 incidents and more than $630 million drained.

Exploit Mechanics

The vulnerable SquidRouterModule accepted a caller-supplied constant string as cryptographic proof that a message was secure. By passing this string, an attacker could execute arbitrary calldata and access any tokens held in the victim's Safes without requiring valid signatures.

According to Squid's official statement, the contract's core router was architecturally separate and untouched by the exploit, and the project emphasized that early public reporting referencing "SquidRouter" was technically inaccurate. The contract shares the Squid name but is a third-party product that chose to integrate with Squid among other protocols and had no contact with the team.

Attacker's Method and Fund Trail

The attacker deployed Foundry-based exploit contracts that called the module's DelegateBundler path, impersonating authorized delegates on each Safe and triggering arbitrary swaps through Uniswap V3 pools, according to Blockaid.

Target assets were swapped through attacker-seeded Uniswap V3 pools into a worthless attacker-created token called "u." The attacker then removed liquidity from the pools and consolidated the proceeds into approximately 3.07 million DAI, now held in a wallet beginning "0xa447...54859," according to PeckShield.

PeckShield identified that the exploiter's initial funding of 2.1 ETH came from Tornado Cash.

Squid's Response

Squid stated that the contract, though bearing the Squid name, is a third-party product unrelated to the protocol. Fig's statement emphasized the project's lack of involvement: "We don't know yet who wrote or deployed this." Squid's official X page added that its core router was architecturally separate and untouched.

Squid's Recent Funding and Security Claims

Squid recently announced a $6 million strategic funding round led by North Island Ventures, with participation from Ripple, Dialectic, and Borderless.

During discussions about the funding, Squid's Fig told The Block that the project has completed nine independent security audits to date, recorded no exploits, and maintained 99.99% uptime. When asked whether Squid is looking to serve projects reassessing their cross-chain infrastructure following security issues elsewhere in the market, Fig said the platform is open to conversations with teams seeking secure connectivity.

DeFi Sector Losses in 2026

Cross-chain interoperability remains one of the most difficult areas in crypto, with the sector experiencing multiple bridge exploits and security incidents over the years. The Block's data dashboard shows that DeFi has logged more than $770 million in losses in 2026, with April alone setting a record of roughly 30 incidents and more than $630 million drained.

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