There is an interesting phenomenon. When the Walrus protocol needs a major upgrade, such as changing the core coding algorithm, token holders can theoretically vote to decide the direction. It sounds democratic and transparent.

But here’s the problem. If the upgrade affects the interests of major nodes or large stakers—such as raising hardware requirements or changing reward distribution—these vested interests are very likely to veto collectively. Even more harshly, they might threaten: either comply or we initiate a fork.

This creates a "fork veto right." Any deep optimization that threatens vested interests gets blocked. The final result is that the protocol is "frozen" in that suboptimal but politically safe version—technologically not advanced enough, but no one dares to move.

How to break the deadlock? Two ideas are worth trying: First, separate the technical upgrade from the tokenomics upgrade to reduce the risk of touching overall interests; second, establish a reasonable exit compensation mechanism for early contributors, using economic incentives to gain their support for long-term development. This way, participant rights are protected, and room is left for protocol evolution.