Futures
Access hundreds of perpetual contracts
TradFi
Gold
One platform for global traditional assets
Options
Hot
Trade European-style vanilla options
Unified Account
Maximize your capital efficiency
Demo Trading
Introduction to Futures Trading
Learn the basics of futures trading
Futures Events
Join events to earn rewards
Demo Trading
Use virtual funds to practice risk-free trading
Launch
CandyDrop
Collect candies to earn airdrops
Launchpool
Quick staking, earn potential new tokens
HODLer Airdrop
Hold GT and get massive airdrops for free
Pre-IPOs
Unlock full access to global stock IPOs
Alpha Points
Trade on-chain assets and earn airdrops
Futures Points
Earn futures points and claim airdrop rewards
Your funds in Aave nearly disappeared.
No joke.
Just last night, an attack caused $236 million in bad debt for Aave.
If Kelp DAO hadn't hit the pause button within 46 minutes, if the hacker had kept smashing for a while longer—what you see when you open Aave now might not be interest rates, but "the project has gone bankrupt."
This isn't meant to scare you.
This is the biggest DeFi attack in history by 2026, even larger than Drift.
What happened?
There’s a protocol called Kelp DAO that issued a token called rsETH, which you can think of as a "LRT re-staking certificate."
This token relies on the LayerZero cross-chain bridge, jumping back and forth between different chains.
Yesterday, the hacker discovered a vulnerability in LayerZero—simply put:
They forged a "message from Chain A," telling Kelp’s bridge: "Hey, someone deposited ETH on a certain chain, quickly mint 116.5k rsETH for them."
Kelp’s contract believed it.
As a result, 116,500 rsETH appeared out of nowhere, accounting for 18% of the circulating supply, worth $292 million.
After obtaining these rsETH, the hacker did two things:
1. Deposited them as collateral in Aave, Compound, Euler to borrow ETH
2. Sold some directly
Finally, they cashed out 74,000 ETH, about $116.5k.
Aave incurred $236 million in bad debt because of this rsETH collateral.
What does that mean?
The hacker used fake tokens as collateral to borrow real ETH. Now the fake tokens are worthless, and Aave’s collateral is just air. This $236 million is absorbed by Aave itself.
The AAVE token dropped 10% directly.
Even more chilling:
Five hours before the attack, Justin Sun withdrew 53,665 ETH worth $1.26 billion from Aave.
The money is still in his wallet, untouched.
No evidence links him directly. But if you see someone leaving the table just five minutes before a massive explosion—you’d think what?
You get the point.
Sun’s withdrawal time was even more precise than my alarm clock.
The 46-minute pause saved Kelp but couldn’t save Aave’s $236 million bad debt.
How should we price systemic risks in DeFi Lego systems?
No one dares to answer seriously.
We shout "composability" every day, boast about "money Lego"—but no one tells you:
When you put A protocol’s rsETH into B protocol as collateral, borrow C protocol’s ETH, and finally do LP in D protocol—
You have no idea that a single vulnerability in A could cause B, C, and D to blow up together.
Yesterday’s incident is textbook-level contagious risk:
1. LayerZero vulnerability →
2. Kelp DAO is minted out of thin air →
3. rsETH devalues →
4. Aave shows bad debt →
5. AAVE token drops 10% →
6. Other protocols (SparkLend, Fluid, Upshift) freeze rsETH markets
One chain breaks, the whole building shakes.
Currently, DeFi’s review of "collateral quality" is basically nonexistent.
rsETH, as an LRT derivative, is already triple-nested (ETH → LST → LRT → cross-chain certificate), now directly used as collateral in Aave.
What review did Aave do on it?
None.
It only looks at one thing: liquidity.
As long as the pool has depth and the price doesn’t fall below liquidation, it’s fine.
But the problem is—attacks aren’t price fluctuations; they’re minting out of thin air.
No matter how accurate your price oracle is, it can’t prevent "token supply doubling."
Who should pay for this?
Now Aave has $236 million in bad debt.
- Aave itself? Then AAVE holders will be diluted.
- Kelp DAO? They tried their best to pause the contract in 46 minutes, does the treasury have enough to cover?
- LayerZero? The vulnerability is in it, but it’s infrastructure.
- Users? Your deposited funds are borrowed away by hackers—are you the one paying?
No one wants to answer this question. Because the answer is brutal:
The systemic risk in DeFi ultimately falls on liquidity providers—that’s you.
Who do you think should pay for this $236 million bad debt?
A. Aave bears it (they collected your interest)
B. Kelp DAO pays (your issued tokens)
C. LayerZero compensates (your code has a vulnerability)
D. Users accept it (it’s not the first time anyway)
Comment below with your answer. #山寨币强势反弹 #GatePreIPOs首发SpaceX $BTC $ETH